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Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566

Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence

Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014

-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328002

Blowing the Whistle

Apesteguia, José; Dufwenberg, Martin; Selten, Reinhard - 2003

-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263063

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 109 (2015), pp. 72-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011396765

Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies

Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015

We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors ́actions on cartel stability and firms ́incentives … to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532614

Trust and recidivism : the partial success of corporate leniency program in the laboratory

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Soetevent, Adriaan - 2006

cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349188

Explicit vs. tacit collusion : the impact of communication in oligopoly experiments

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: European economic review : EER 56 (2012) 8, pp. 1759-1772

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706419

Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence

Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014

-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228272

Endogenous cartel formation : experimental evidence

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2014

may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2014 - [Rev.] November 2014

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107