This paper presents an experiment to test effects of sequential entry on stability of collusion in oligopoly markets …. Previous research suggests that the larger the number of firms, the harder it is to sustain collusion. We find that when groups … start off small and the entrant is informed about the history of her group, collusion is easier to sustain than in groups …

. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying … oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three …

, limited to one entrant per period, or subject to an entry exam. We include two additional treatments that combine the two …

difference in average total outputs across data aggregation and information settings. However, we observe more collusion when …

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our … information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon …

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our … information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …

experiments in contrast to analog experimental results on price-competition in the literature. …