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College admissions with entrance exams : centralized versus decentralized
Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2016
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437881
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Sheremeta, … - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 18 (2015) 4, pp. 609-669
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530677
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College admissions with entrance exams : centralized versus decentralized
Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2014
their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413636
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Contests at the workplace with and without prize selection : testing theory in a field experiment
Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016
four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to … same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly … by lower-ability players. Division of prizes leads to the predicted effects. In parallel contests, too many players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574129
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College admissions with entrance exams : centralized versus decentralized
Hafalir, Isa; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - In: Journal of economic theory 176 (2018), pp. 886-934
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980944
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College admissions with entrance exams : centralized versus decentralized
Hafalir, Isa; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2018
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138431
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Rent seeking with regretful agents: Theory and experiment
Hyndman, Kyle; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 3, pp. 866-878
We investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort, but only the winner is rewarded. Through the lens of all pay auctions, we show that bidders who have regret concerns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594592
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Does the Better-than-Average Effect Show that People are Overconfident? : Two Experiments
Benoit, Jean-Pierre - 2014
We conduct two experimental tests of the claim that people are overconfident, using new tests of overplacement that are based on a formal Bayesian model. Our two experiments, on easy quizzes, find that people overplace themselves. More precisely, we find apparently overconfident data that cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052977
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Does the Better-than-Average Effect Show that People are Overconfident? : Two Experiments
Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan; Moore, Don A. - 2013
We conduct two experiments of the claim that people are overconfident. We develop new tests of overplacement which are based on a formal Bayesian model. Our two experiments, on easy quizzes, find overplacement. More precisely, we find apparently overconfident data that cannot be accounted for by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160015
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Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment
Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999
Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472