This paper uses a novel experimental design to test for the role of experience and information in insurance take-up in rural China, where weather insurance was a new and highly subsidized product. We randomly select a group of poor households to play insurance games and find that it improves the...

This study examines the effect of experience and knowledge on weather insurance adoption. First, we conduct insurance games with farmers, and find that the treatment improves real insurance take-up by 46%. The effect is not driven by changes in risk attitudes and perceived probability of...

Many new products presumed to be privately beneficial to the poor have a high price elasticity of demand and ultimately zero take-up rate at market price. This has led governments and donors to provide subsidies to increase take-up, with the concern of trying to limit their cost. In this study,...

This study examines the effect of experience and knowledge on weather insurance adoption. First, we conduct insurance games with farmers, and find that the treatment improves real insurance take-up by 46%. The effect is not driven by changes in risk attitudes and perceived probability of...

Many new products presumed to be privately beneficial to the poor have a high price elasticity of demand and ultimately zero take-up rate at market price. This has led governments and donors to provide subsidies to increase take-up, with the concern of trying to limit their cost. In this study,...