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Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566

Employee types and endogenous organizational design

Cunyat, Antoni; Sloof, Randolph - 2008

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374422

Organizational design of University laboratories : task allocation and lab performance in Japanese bioscience laboratories

Shibayama, Sotaro; Baba, Yasunori; Walsh, John P. - In: Research policy : policy, management and economic … 44 (2015) 3, pp. 610-622

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333696

Peer settings induce cheating on task performance

Bäker, Agnes; Mechtel, Mario - 2015

Recent research has shown that the presence of peers can increase individual output both in the lab and the field. This paper tests for negative side effects of peer settings. We investigate whether peer settings are particularly prone to cheating even if they do not provide additional monetary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530020

Context and aggregation : an experimental study of bias and discrimination in organizational decisions

Christensen, Michael; Dahl, Christian M.; Knudsen, … - In: Organization science 34 (2023) 6, pp. 2163-2181

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014465956

Trade promotion decisions under demand uncertainty : a market experiment approach

Hong, Yuan; Gómez, Miguel I.; Rao, Vithala R. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 59 (2013) 7, pp. 1709-1724

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784104

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - 2008

the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according …