We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the …

third-party contract enforcement while informal institutions are represented as shared group identity. Results show that … trust choices increase as contract enforcement increases but are not affected by shared group identity. However, performance …

experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as … outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may conclude a contract but also breach it by side-selling or arbitrary …-order enforcement. Moreover, we investigate whether company players offer price premiums to extend the contract’s self-enforcing range …

of the contract. To test the effect of debt contract enforcement on borrowers' timely loss recognition, we exploit the … staggered introduction of enhanced debt contract enforcement in Indian states as a natural experiment, where the implementation …, consistent with a collateral-based explanation. This study also provides causal evidence that firms adopt conservative accounting …

of the contract. To test the effect of debt contract enforcement on borrowers' timely loss recognition, we exploit the … staggered introduction of enhanced debt contract enforcement in Indian states as a natural experiment, where the implementation …, consistent with a collateral‐based explanation. This study also provides causal evidence that firms adopt conservative accounting …

reputation serves as a collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement …

third-party contract enforcement while informal institutions are represented as shared group identity. Results show that … trust choices increase as contract enforcement increases but are not affected by shared group identity. However, performance …