How do successive, forward-looking agents experiment with interdependent and endogenous technologies? In this paper, trying a radically new technology not only is informative of the value of similar technologies, but also reduces the cost of experimenting with them, in effect expanding the space...

The key role of technological change in the decline of energy and carbon intensities of aggregate economic activities is widely recognized. This has focused attention on the issue of developing endogenous models for the evolution of technological change. With a few exceptions this is done using...

This paper argues that the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change was doomed to face difficulties ab initio. It explains why this is the case by analyzing the Kyoto Protocol’s shortcomings and deficiencies. Moving the climate change agenda forward multilaterally...

This article aims to test the relevance of learning through Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Learning Classifier Systems (LCS), in opposition with fixed R&D rules, in a simplified version of the evolutionary industry model of Nelson and Winter. These three R&D strategies are compared from the points...

We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers and the intensity of competition. Consistently...

We explore the relationship between personal characteristics and the decision to lie to an anonymous partner in a cheap talk environment. We find that sex, age, grade point average, student debt, size of return, socioeconomic status, and average time spent in religious observation are not...

Responsiveness to payoffs and differences in culture have been considered as reasons why women have a greater aversion to lying than men. By using smaller stakes in a sender–receiver game than Dreber and Johannesson, but similar culture, no gender difference was found.

Aversion to lying has been consistently observed in sender–receiver games. Women have demonstrated greater aversion to lying for a small monetary benefit in these games than men. We test the robustness of this gender difference in a sender–receiver game with larger stakes. We find no...