Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and...

Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and...

In this paper we review, upgrade, and synthesize existing models from evolutionary game theory, all of which aim at explaining human behaviour in the ultimatum game. Our new and improved versions of Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), and Rand et al. (2013) avoid shortcomings that the...