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Workers' participation in wage setting and opportnistic behaviour : evidence from a gift-exchange experiment

Franke, Jörg; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Mertins, Vanessa - 2014

Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The … is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers' participation leads actually to a … decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338138

Sabotage in Tournaments:Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2009

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical dataon induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in acontrolled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory:effort and sabotage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868022

Sabotage in tournaments : evidence from a laboratory experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2009

curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output. -- Sabotage ; tournament ; reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003859419

Workers' participation in wage setting : a gift-exchange experiment

Franke, Jörg; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Mertins, Vanessa - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 56 (2016), pp. 151-162

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704331

Workers participation in wage setting and opportunistic behavior : evidence from a gift-exchange experiment

Franke, Jörg; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Mertins, Vanessa - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347361

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080

Helping in teams

Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2014

We study, how help can be fostered under relative rewards by means of team bonus and corporate value statements. A simple model analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. As one potential measure to encourage help, we augment relative rewards with team rewards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457828

Sabotage in Tournaments : Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Harbring, Christine - 2009

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158876

Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives

Danilov, Anastasia; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Harbring, Christine - 2019

We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011997551

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004

reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay. Other-regarding preferences influence both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940

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