Showing 1 - 10 of 44,300
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752208
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects' risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397176
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects' risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009774194
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839581
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681772
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010187186
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects’ risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729430
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects' risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684334
in Raven's progressive matrices test also display significantly higher levels of reasoning in our persuasion games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789435