The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether …-bid auction and three di erent descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness … mechanisms influence the reference state and that auctions that foster reference-state shifts lead to lower payments for the …

activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …

The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This pa- per explores whether …-bid auction and three different descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness … mechanisms influence the reference state and that auctions that foster reference-state shifts lead to lower payments for the …

activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …

Several Japanese local governments started to add endogenous minimum prices to firstprice auctions in their public …