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An instrumental perspective on apologizing in bargaining : the importance of forgiveness to apologize
Leunissen, Joost M.; De Cremer, David; Reinders Folmer, … - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 33 (2012) 1, pp. 215-222
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488920
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Endogenous Claims and Collective Production : An Experimental Study on the Timing of Profit-Sharing Negotiations and Production
Baranski, Andrzej - 2018
We explore the efficiency and distributive implications (theoretically and experimentally) of a multilateral bargaining … model with endogenous production of the surplus under two different timings: ex ante and ex post bargaining. Both timings … economic tenet: in ex post bargaining, effort is considered sunk and opportunistic bargaining behavior will dissuade players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936225
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Principal-Agent Negotiations with Teams of Agents : Experimental Evidence
Whitford, Andrew B. - 2015
We examine how a principal implements a joint forcing contract for a team of two agents, whose joint product determines the value of the principal's asset. We focus on the "agents' problem": whether to contribute to a public good when one's costly contribution is unobservable. Our experiments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027665
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How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity?
Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian - 2013
Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332036
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Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition
Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - 2008
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333998
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004
Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080
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Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Schipper, Burkhard C.; Raab, Philippe - 2004
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263110
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Organizations, diffused pivotality and immoral outcomes
Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora - 2013
This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316436
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How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity?
Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian - 2013
Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316868
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Risk Taking in Winner-Take-AllCompetition
Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - Universität <Bonn> / Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher … - 2008
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players.At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stagetwo, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneouslyinvest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009354148