individual's likelihood of sending costly peer punishment is examined. Actigraphy sleep monitoring watches are used to validate …-parametric as well as regression analysis, we find that when punishment is not available, sleep restriction does not affect the … contributions made to joint production. When punishment is available, we find weak evidence that SR subjects contribute more than WR …

welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate …

welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate …

monitors'). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power … evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation. …

Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding …, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at … strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is …

punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to … individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under … perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a …

decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three … participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams … contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team …

underlying such acts? Will people rely on "excuses" to avoid acting on costly punishment intentions, as with other costly pro … differences in motives underlying second- and third-party punishment. …

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer …, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the … independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on …