In his classic article “An Essay on Bargaining” Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining experiment where … proposer. In additional treatments we investigate bargaining situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. …

We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the …

Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as … attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where …

We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all …

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The … experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are …. Overall, the results suggest that the Abreu and Gul (2000) model can be used to gain insights to bargaining behavior …

therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining …

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options …

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting …