contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty …

tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger …

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the … bottom, or both. In this paper we test the effectiveness and efficiency of these incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize … levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward …

pressure. Nonetheless, when facing a penalty incentive scheme these individuals are more likely to choose to work with strict …

individualistic (Solo) or one of two team incentives. Under our Cooperative team incentive, workers equally share the team's earnings …. Under our Competitive team incentive, the best performer gets an additional bonus proportional to the team's total … individualistic incentive. …

breach is efficient when performance of a contract generates a negative total surplus for the parties. However, by … different from loss-avoiding breaches. To capture these different motives, we designed a novel game called Contract-Breach Game …

negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains …We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract … incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on …