Showing 1 - 10 of 1,465
Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946017
We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321709
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787201
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
This paper analyzes the trade of an indivisible good within a two-stage mechanism, where a seller first negotiates with one potential buyer about the price of the good. If the negotiation fails to produce a sale, a second 'price sealed' bid auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365906
secondprice-auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation … bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471404