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Kräkel, Matthias - 2014

In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430294

Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility : An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the contractibility of the outcome plays a crucial role when effort is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105234

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract : Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I. - 2009

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718247

A Model of Moral Hazard with Inequity Aversion : An Experimental Test

Chernomaz, Kirill - 2011

This paper experimentally tests a moral hazard model with inequity aversion. In the model, the probability of high and low employer's revenues is determined by actions of the worker. The employer offers a revenue-dependent wage to an inequity-averse worker. In contrast to the models that assume...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013127781

Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences

Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838

Ordered leniency : an experimental study of law enforcement with self-reporting

Landeo, Claudia; Spier, Kathryn E. - 2018

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an enforcement agency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered-leniency policies, early cooperators receive reduced sanctions. We replicate the strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927250

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences : An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2012

Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162484

Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions : Theory and Experiments

Landeo, Claudia M. - 2014

In tort litigation, delayed settlement or impasse imposes high costs on the parties and society. Litigation institutions might influence social welfare by affecting the likelihood of out-of-court settlement and the potential injurers' investment in product safety. An appropriate design of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139770

Incentive Contracts for Teams : Experimental Evidence

Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E. - 2015

This paper reports the results of an experiment on incentive contracts for teams. The agents, whose efforts are complementary, are rewarded according to a sharing rule chosen by the principal. Depending on the sharing rule, the agents confront endogenous prisoner's dilemma or stag-hunt...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145295

Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism : Experimental Evidence

Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E. - 2015

This paper experimentally studies stipulated damages as a rent-extraction mechanism. We demonstrate that contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014167645

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