Much of economics assumes that higher incentives increase participation in a transaction only because they exceed more people's reservation price. This paper shows theoretically and experimentally that when information about the consequences is costly, higher incentives also change reservation...

This paper studies static rational inattention problems with multiple actions and multiple shocks. We solve for the optimal signals chosen by agents and provide tools to interpret information processing. By relaxing restrictive assumptions previously used to gain tractability, we allow agents...

We review methodological questions relevant for the design of information provision experiments. We first provide a literature review of major areas in which information provision experiments are applied. We then outline key measurement challenges and design recommendations that may be of help...

We review the emerging literature on information acquisition in field settings. We first document an increase in studies on information acquisition and review relevant studies in different subfields of economics, including macroeconomics, political economy, labor economics, health economics, and...

This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-making processes in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information. Committees improve the quality of decision-making by providing information and by coordinating the collection of information. We address...