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We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146346
We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012150752
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which are strategically equivalent under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753992
activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500904
In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability … auctions, I show that by decreasing the time between bids and revelation of results, the auctioneer can induce bidders to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463574
Will generous return policies in auctions benefit bidders? We investigate this issue using second-price common …-value auctions. Theoretically, we find that the bidding equilibrium is unique unless returns are free, in which case there exist …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261886
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099055