We use economic experiments to examine the nature of relational trading under a menu of incomplete contracts ranging … from the repeat purchase mechanism of Klein and Leffler (1981) to highly incomplete contracts that are completely … contractual incompleteness can enhance efficiency. Intuitively, more incomplete contracts provide parties with greater …

-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …

-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …

-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …

risk by overrating the agent's performance. Second, I show that by screening for one supervisor type, firms can incentivize … the supervisor to truthfully report performance at the lowest possible costs. For this reason, screening may be optimal …

certain optimism (whereby subjects overestimate probabilities for favorable outcomes), the former being about twice as strong …

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …