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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012216055
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453845
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944972
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946499
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009705800
Motivated by practical applications, chiefly clinical trials, we study the regret achievable for stochastic bandits under the constraint that the employed policy must split trials into a small number of batches. Our results show that a very small number of batches gives close to minimax optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012898
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009780703
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919161
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584328
This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838