Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...

Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...

Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...

A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent being relatively more optimistic than the low type. The agent also engages...

Ever since the seminal RAND Health insurance experiment (HIE) was conducted, most health care services, including pharmaceuticals, are deemed to be price inelastic with price elasticities of demand (PED) close to -0.20. However, most studies of PED exploit natural experiments that change demand...

Ever since the seminal RAND Health insurance experiment (HIE) was conducted, most health care services, including pharmaceuticals, are deemed to be price inelastic with price elasticities of demand (PED) close to -0.20. However, most studies of PED exploit natural experiments that change demand...