Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of ?social preferences?. We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing...

Participants in experimental games typically can only choose actions, without making comments about other participants' future actions. In sequential two-person games, we allow first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder behavior differs substantially...

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using the Kahneman and Tversky (1983) experimental design, we find that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction...

The Winner's Curse (WC) is one of the most robust and persistent deviations from theoretical predictions that has been established in experimental economics and claimed to exist in many field environments. There have been many attempts to explain the winner's curse, such as ignoring the...

We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. Such networks could arise due to proximity issues or restricted communication flows, as with information transmission of job openings, business...

We explore the effects of social distance in experiments conducted over the Internet on three continents, in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain, and in computer sessions pairing participants from different states-one in Texas and the other in California. Our design...

Deferred Acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that—in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments—participants frequently play...

Economists have developed various methods to elicit risk preferences, which can help forecast decision-making in risky scenarios. However, risk elicitation can be complex, and there remain unresolved challenges. Our research demonstrates that repeated exposure to risk elicitation tasks, such as...

How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but...

This paper addresses the question of whether our evolutionary history suggests that humans are likely to be individually selected selfish maximizers or group selected altruists. It surveys models from the literature of evolutionary biology in which groups are formed and dissolved and where the...