We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

This paper explores the reluctance of men (women) to acknowledge or recognise the work, comments, and claims of new ideas by other men (women) via widespread and intense demonstrations of indifference. Instances like desk rejections by journals by not allowing papers to reach a review stage,...

For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not in line: While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-)coordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non Nash) strategy...

While infinitely repeated games with payoff discounting are theoretically isomorphic to randomly terminated repeated games without payoff discounting, in practice, they correspond to very different environments. The standard method for implementing infinitely repeated games in the laboratory...

Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...

Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...

We design a transboundary public goods (TPG) game, in which participants have simultaneous interaction within and between groups. We design the TPG game under an infinitely repeated situation in order to explore the types of strategies that participants employ in infinitely repeated games. We...

This paper looks to see if subjects approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games featuring discounted payoffs with an option to opt out differently from how they approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that are randomly terminated. I show under relatively...

We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, and our data support this prediction, although this result attenuates with contest experience....

Reanalyzing 12 experiments on the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD), we robustly observe three distinct subject types: defectors, cautious cooperators and strong cooperators. The strategies used by these types are surprisingly stable across experiments and uncorrelated with treatment parameters,...