Showing 1 - 10 of 3,079
This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111150
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
In this experimental study, we compare the influence of risk communication in the form of stories versus statistics on the level of investment in a resilience-promoting activity. We also analyze how this influence interacts with time gap and with an individual’s preferences for risk and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010407915
In this experimental study, we compare the influence of risk communication in the form of stories versus statistics on the level of investment in a resilience-promoting activity. We also analyze how this influence interacts with time gap and with an individual's preferences for risk and numbers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495314
assessments. We investigate this theory in the lab, using treatments with and without reputation concerns and with and without … their assessments less dependent on actual decisions and statements. With or without reputation concerns, for the majority …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895939
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130
Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries … between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on …-mail requests to insurance brokers asking for an appointment. We find that status nudging and, with a larger effect size, reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012130122
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012162722