We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...

While incentive framing has been shown to promote workers' effort, little is known about how it affects other dimensions of the employer-employee relationship. This paper examines whether incentive framing can also influence workers propensity to engage in an activity disloyal to their employer:...

Synopsis of whole book instead of Abstract: This volume provides a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on corruption generated by recent laboratory and field experiments conducted by economists and political scientists. The first part of the volume reviews the evidence produced by...

We designed a public good laboratory experiment in order to identify the causal relationships between tax evasion and corruption and query whether deterring one of these behaviors may have desirable spillover effects on the other. To do so, we analyse the effects of deterrence when the target is...

In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A’s decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect...

Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy. • Even when they themselves stand to lose, policymakers may enact deterrence policies with real teeth… • … However, policymakers’ legitimacy is crucial: a given...