We study venture capital finance with experimentation. An entrepreneur contracts with an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation by both parties to succeed. In equilibrium, investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous...

Entrepreneurs must experiment to learn how good they are at a new activity. What happens when the experimentation is financed by a lender? Under common scenarios, i.e., when there is the opportunity to learn by "starting small" or when "no-compete" clauses cannot be enforced ex-post, we show...

We study how technological shocks to the cost of starting new businesses have led the venture capital model to adapt in fundamental ways over the prior decade. We both document and provide a framework to understand the changes in the investment strategy of venture capitalists (VCs) in recent...

Leveraging the detailed project-level data on biotech startups and their IPO records, this paper studies how adverse selection in capital markets affects financing decisions of entrepreneurs and firm values. By structurally estimating a dynamic model that features strategic experimentation and...