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Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Games and economic behavior 121 (2020), pp. 329-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430288

Extensive-form level-k thinking

Schipper, Burkhard; Zhou, Hang - 2022

Level-k thinking and Cognitive Hierarchy have been widely applied as a normalform solution concept in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013350881

Disclosure of information under competition : an experimental study

Sheth, Jesal - 2019

The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information … adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure … that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024603

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256036

An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353

Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257267

Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games

McKinney, C. Nicholas; Huyck, John B. Van - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 223-232

This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662454

Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment

Drugov, Mikhail; Hernán-González, Roberto; Kujal, Praveen - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

In this paper we experimentally test strategic information transmission between one informed and two uninformed agents in a cheap-talk game. We find evidence of the "disciplining" effect of public communication as compared to private; however, it is much weaker than predicted by the theory....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817403

Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94 (2013) C, pp. 268-277

We examine subjects’ behavior in sender–receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719252

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