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We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430288
We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer …-dimensional. We design two experimental treatments: In the unawareness treatment, the buyer is uncertain about the first dimension …, but unaware of the second. Here, unawareness refers to a lack of conception rather than lack of information. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015405163
Level-k thinking and Cognitive Hierarchy have been widely applied as a normalform solution concept in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013350881
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information … adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure … that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024603
without unawareness. We extend our results by allowing communication and show convergence to flirt-proof self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015405164
We use the investment game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) to explore gender differences in trust and reciprocity. In doing so we replicate and extend the results first reported by Croson and Buchan (1999). We find that men exhibit greater trust than women do while women show much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263242
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326221
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491401