Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short-term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this...

Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short-term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this...

We examine the realism of the assumption of self-interested opportunism in agency theory. We place subjects into manager/producer pairs and set parameters so that the producer extracts the highest share of residual earnings from the manager by setting the budget at zero (100% slack) and...

We explore how audit committees (ACs) support audit engagement teams and whether AC support can improve auditors’ professional skepticism. We first survey audit practitioners and find that AC support is multidimensional, varies between engagements, and often is not communicated to the entire...

Using an experimental design that exploits exogenous reductions in coverage resulting from brokerage house mergers, we find that a reduction in coverage causes a deterioration in financial reporting quality. The effect of coverage on disclosure is more pronounced for firms with weak shareholder...

This paper analyzes the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on the weighting and combination of performance measures as well as on a firm's profitability. We consider rivalry, egoism and altruism as extreme forms within the continuum of possible preferences and show that the principal...

We study how securities analysts influence managers' use of different types of earnings management. To isolate causality, we employ a quasi-experiment that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst following resulting from brokerage house mergers. We find that managers respond to the coverage...

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...

We model a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. The manager prefers delegating when uncertainty is sufficiently high relative to the incentive conflict...

This paper studies a two stage incomplete contract between a buyer and a seller, with specific investments and endogenous outside options. Given that a party's outside option identifies counterpart's competitors, with such endogenous outside options, some of the main conclusions of the standard...