We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In combination with the finding that...

We empirically compare the consistency among several measures of risk-taking and patience by evaluating how these variables relate to financial decisions. The variables are based on a sample of more than 700 individuals across 9 countries. The main finding is that self-reported, simple questions...

We propose that there are three determinants of sender behavior in trust games: Beliefs re-garding the amounts returned, risk aversion, and reciprocity. Particularly, we are interested in the role of reciprocity because the possibility of negative expected reciprocal utility may lead to...

In this paper we analyze negative reciprocity theoretically as well as experimentally. Although the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is often cited in the literature to justify why people punish unkind behavior, we show that this model is not able to predict punishments in...

In this paper, we examine differences in choice patterns between delay and speedup frames and refer to these differences in choice tasks as time framing effects. Framing effects in choice tasks seem to be less significant than corresponding framing effects in matching tasks and this result seems...

Studying a binary-choice trust game, we find that trustors who consider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate are ceteris paribus less willing to trust. We argue that norm-orientated trustors anticipate that they will experience negative emotions should trustees violate the obligation to...