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Corruption in Committees : An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting
Morton, Rebecca - 2014
We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts … are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such … decreased abstention when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047178
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On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout
Klor, Esteban F.; Winter, Eyal - 2006
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058888
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Corruption in committees : an experimental study of information aggregation through voting
Morten, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Journal of public economic theory 17 (2015) 4, pp. 553-579
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350127
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Corruption in committees : an experimental study of information aggregation through voting
Morton, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406876
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - 2015 - Revised version, April 2015
This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243444
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Informative voting and the Samuelson rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374864
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Choosing voting systems behind the veil of Ignorance : a two-tier voting experiment
Weber, Matthias - 2014
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group represented by a single person. A natural question is what voting system such a committee should use. Concepts based on voting power provide guidelines for this choice. The two most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337025
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How transparency kills information aggregation : (and why that may be a good thing) ; conference paper
Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall - 2014
than in theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486059
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Choosing Voting Systems Behind the Veil of Ignorance : A Two-Tier Voting Experiment
Weber, Matthias - 2017
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group represented by a single person. A natural question is what voting system such a committee should use. Concepts based on voting power provide guidelines for this choice. The two most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953580
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Conformity, Information and Truthful Voting
Moreno, Bernardo - 2016
We induce conformity in a binary-decision voting game by assuming that agents may derive some utility by voting the same option that others. Theoretically, we show that truthful voting is the unique equilibrium without conformity. Introducing conformity enlarges the set of equilibria, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997748