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How do electoral and voice accountability affect corruption? : experimental evidence from Egypt

Mansour, Sarah; Wallace, Sally; Sadiraj, Vjollca; … - In: European journal of political economy 68 (2021), pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012939060

Using Discourse to Incentivize Cooperation in Arab-Muslim Culture : Experimental Evidence from Egypt

Mansour, Sarah; Hassan, Mazen; Voigt, Stefan; Amin, Engi - 2022

answer these questions, we ran two public good games with 276 participants in Egypt. In the first experiment, we show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291476

How Tempting is Corruption? - More Bad News About Economists

Frank, Björn; Schulze, Gunther G. - 1998

In this paper, we report on an experiment on corruption which investigates various determinants of corruptibility. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224699

Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery

Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Yu, Gaoneng - 2012

corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487845

Anti-corruption policy-making, discretionary power, and institutional quality : an experimental analysis

Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert - 2016

We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public … officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability … legal equality can be considered worse in reducing corruption. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517268

Institutional Choice and Cooperation in Representative Democracies : An Experimental Approach

Schories, Fanny - 2017

This paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected parties rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design is able to control for selection effects arising from the democratic policy choice. I find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958891

Conflict Resolution vs. Conflict Escalation in Online Markets

Bolton, Gary - 2015

Many online markets encourage traders to make good after an unsatisfactory transaction by offering the opportunity of withdrawing negative reputational feedback in a conflict resolution phase. Motivated by field evidence and guided by theoretical considerations, we use laboratory markets with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016542

Sustaining Group Reputation

Kimbrough, Erik O. - 2015

When individuals trade with strangers, there is a temptation to renege on agreements. If repeated interaction or exogenous enforcement are unavailable, societies often solve this problem via institutions that rely on group, rather than individual, reputation. Groups can employ two mechanisms to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035636

Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

Bolton, Gary E. - 2009

Reciprocal feedback distorts the production and content of reputation information, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Data from eBay and other sources combined with laboratory data provide a robust picture of how reciprocity can be guided by changes in the way feedback information flows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718815

Institutional choice and cooperation in representative democracies : an experimental approach

Schories, Fanny E. - 2017

This paper examines whether an institution has a differing impa ct on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected partie s rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design is able to control for selec tion effects arising from the democratic policy choice. I find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011741653

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