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experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as … outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may conclude a contract but also breach it by side-selling or arbitrary …-order enforcement. Moreover, we investigate whether company players offer price premiums to extend the contract’s self-enforcing range …
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furtherance of reciprocal, long-term, trust-based relationships. In this article, Professor Leslie argues that relational contract …
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evidence to test these theories by manipulating the extent to which individuals transact repeatedly and the level of contract …
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We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
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We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...
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