In this paper, a tax game with audit costs as a public bad is designed to investigate the impact of public disclosure on tax evasion experimentally. Three different types of tax privacy are tested, ranging from complete privacy to full disclosure. We expect to observe two different effects:...

Privacy law relies on the argument that consent does not entail any relevant impediments for the liberty of the consenting individual. Challenging this argument, we experimentally investigate whether consent to the publication of personal information in cyberspace entails self-coercion on a...

This paper shows that privacy concerns in commercial contexts are not solely driven by a desire to control the transmission of personal information or to avoid intrusive direct marketing campaigns. When they express privacy concerns, consumers anticipate indirect economic consequences of data...

We provide evidence that people have preferences for data privacy and show that these preferences partly reflect people's interest in controlling who receives their private information. Participants of an experiment face the decision to share validated personal information with peers. We compare...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...