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We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070
. Our results are consistent with the theory of strategic ambiguity of Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and can be rationalized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316957
reasonably approximate real-life decision makers' behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318886
predictions. For example, workers allocate more effort to support others in the experiment than that in theory. We apply the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242527
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398756
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399065
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402672
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
mechanism should - in theory - provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004