This paper experimentally studies the impact of uncertainty about bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when stricter disclosure creates common knowledge about bank weakness. Borrowers are also less likely to...

This paper experimentally studies the impact of uncertainty about bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when stricter disclosure creates common knowledge about bank weakness. Borrowers are also less likely to...

This paper experimentally studies the impact of uncertainty about bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when stricter disclosure creates common knowledge about bank weakness. Borrowers are also less likely to...

An insurance contract may be nonperforming—resulting in a situation in which the insured might be worse off than without insurance since also losing the premium. This study revisits how contract nonperformance risk influences individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance contracts. In...

People often fail to insure against catastrophes, even when insurance is subsidized. Even when insuring homes, many homeowners still underinsure the full value of their assets. Some researchers have suggested using long-term insurance contracts to reduce these insurance gaps. We examine...

The actions that individuals take to minimize the impact of risk generally involve cost. Thus, the actions that provide insurance often provide signals with regard to the individuals' underlying quality characteristics. Since the same action affects risk exposure and signals quality, individual...