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Tacit collusion : the neglected experimental evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2015
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483415
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Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2015
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027879
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Tacit Collusion : The Neglected Experimental Evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2007
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that tacit collusion becomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728899
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Punishment Strategies in Repeated Games : Evidence from Experimental Markets
Wright, Julian - 2010
Nash reversion and optimal symmetric two-phase punishment strategies). One hundred pairs of subjects repeatedly set prices … pricing strategies. The equilibrium conditions predicted by theory are not satisfied in any of the elicited strategies. Less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137653
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Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies
Horstmann, Niklas - 2018
We systematically investigate the relationship between the number of firms in a market and tacit collusion by means of a meta-analysis of the literature on oligopoly experiments as well as two of our own experiments with a total of 368 participants. We show that the degree of tacit collusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937619
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Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion : experimental evidence
Hunold, Matthias; Werner, Tobias - 2023
find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442786
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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2014 - [Rev.] November 2014
constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107
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Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65
competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710
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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2012
credible threats, hence, in theory buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments in a three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009661278
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Collusion among many firms : the disciplinary power of targeted punishment
Roux, Catherine; Thöni, Christian - 2013
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. In a series of Cournot oligopoly … experiments with various numbers of firms, we compare production decisions with and without the possibility to target punishment … at specific market participants. We find strong evidence that targeted punishment enables firms to establish and maintain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222148