We study a winner-take-all R&D race where firms are privately informed about the uncertain arrival rate of the invention. Due to the interdependent-value nature of the problem, the equilibrium displays a strong herding effect that distinguishes our framework from war-of-attrition models....

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers' voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price...

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers' voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price...

We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partially informed and ambiguity averse traders. We show theoretically that separable securities, introduced by Ostrovsky (2012) in the context of Subjective Expected Utility, no longer aggregate information if some traders have...

We investigate the informational content of prices in financial asset markets. To do so we use a large number of market experiments where the amount of information held by traders is precisely observed. We derive a new method to estimate how much of this information is incorporated in market...

Despite a vast theoretical literature that builds on costly information acquisition, there is no direct evidence on the importance of information costs in investors’ private information choices. Using a large sample of Chinese mutual fund managers’ visits to firm headquarters and exploiting...