The objective of this paper is to look into the probability that, given the choice, corporate groups would opt for taxation on a consolidated basis. Consolidation would allow them to offset losses crossborder but remove the opportunity to exploit international tax-rate differentials between...

The objective of this paper is to look into the probability that, given the choice, corporate groups would opt for taxation on a consolidated basis. Consolidation would allow them to offset losses crossborder but remove the opportunity to exploit international tax-rate differentials between...

Unilateral adoption of transfer pricing regulations may have a negative impact on real investment by multinational corporations (MNCs). This paper uses a quasi-experimental research design, exploiting unique panel data on domestic and multinational companies in 27 countries during 2006-2014, to...

This paper analyzes fiscal competition under budget rigidities and tax equity (fairness norms). We outline a numerically solvable political economic model that treats the outcome of tax competition as one argument in the governments utility function, the others being public expenditure and tax...

We study the effect of a payoff advantage, symmetric payoff change and policymakers interaction on choices in tax competition games. To examine the first two effects a standard symmetric game is respectively compared to an asymmetric game where one player has a payoff advantage and to another...

We use incentivized economics experiments to test both the point predictions and comparative static predictions of optimal transfer pricing models, comparing behavior under varying conditions, including wholly versus partially-owned subsidiaries and different tariff and tax rates. As predicted,...

This study investigates how headquarters involvement affects the efficiency of decentralized transfer price negotiations. Prior research assumes that decentralized managers negotiate transfer prices autonomously. However, evidence suggests that headquarters can become involved in transfer price...