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Bargaining with charitable promises : true preferences and strategic behavior
Lange, Andreas; Schwirplies, Claudia - 2021
We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggest a split between himself, the responder and a char-itable donation. By reneging on initial pledges,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534829
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To commit or not to commit? : an experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information
Hoffmann, Sönke; Mihm, Benedikt; Weimann, Joachim - 2014
likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over … their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361371
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Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence : experimental evidence
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Li, Yan; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2018
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra-competitive profits....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844753
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The coordination value of monetary exchange : experimental evidence
Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco - 2011
and uncover a new behavioral foundation for the use of monetary systems. In an experiment, anonymous subjects could …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735015
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Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation : evidence from gift-exchange experiments
Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred - 2024
Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014502768
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Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation : evidence from gift-exchange experiments
Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred - 2024
Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529308
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On the Behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum Games
Brenner, Thomas; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2003
We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075019
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The Unintended Consequences of Headquarters’ Involvement in Decentralized Transfer Price Negotiations : Experimental Evidence
Arnold, Markus C. - 2016
negotiations. Prior research assumes that decentralized managers negotiate transfer prices autonomously. However, evidence suggests … that headquarters can become involved in transfer price negotiations, particularly after negotiation failure. While the … after negotiation failure. In an experiment, we manipulate whether headquarters involvement is absent vs. present. Nested …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985148
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Bargaining and Reputation : An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioral Types
Embrey, Matthew - 2014
We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067332
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Bargaining with a residual claimant : an experimental study
Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno - 2014
We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438024