We experimentally study bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions where bidders' capacity constraints are private information. Treatment differs in the ex-ante probability distribution of sellers' capacities and in the (exogenous) probability that the second auction is...

The dynamics of incentive contracts under asymmetric information have long been an important topic in economics. We address this topic in this paper by considering a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship, in which the true state of the world can take on two possible values and is...

The dynamics of a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. Compared to...

This paper studies a sender-receiver game under sequential private experimentation, in which neither the experiments nor the amount of time spent are publicly observable. The uninformed sender persuades the receiver for a high reward by revealing experimental outcomes selectively. The experiment...

The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This pa- per explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness- to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory experiment, we compare four different second-price...