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We study the evolution of strategic psychological capabilities in a population of interacting agents. Specifically,we consider agentswhich are either blind orwithmindsight, and either transparent or opaque. An agent with mindsight can observe the psychological makeup of a transparent agent,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550559
During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition and, indirectly, of behaviorism we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809939
resource, and there is uncertainty about who will win the resource if they choose to compete. Players have different confidence … know her opponent's confidence level. We characterize the evolutionarily stable equilibrium, represented by players …' strategies and distribution of confidence levels. Under different informational environments, a majority of players are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853848
We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012005678
We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011743
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383906
This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440934
We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014584425
Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034691
This paper provides an analytical model to study the co-evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a game-theoretic framework. Trust reflects an agent’s belief that other agents cooperate in a two-stage prisoner’s dilemma game. Altruist agents receive a utility from their opponents’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014358386