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In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013448173
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013450739
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013468203
How do people choose what economic advice to heed? We develop a set of validated multiple-choice questions on economic policy problems, to examine empirically the persuasiveness of expert versus populist advice. We define populism as advice that conforms to commonly held beliefs, even when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012829008
In a set of preregistered experiments with general population, participants receive recommended answers to an economics questionnaire by two computerized advisors. One advisor is of high-accuracy (the Expert) and recommends the answers produced by academic consensus. The other advisor is of low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259649
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014283870
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164755
Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others' work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229865
We examine whether the "Level-k" model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010249635
Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each other's work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009777770