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Experimental identification of asymmetric information : evidence on crop insurance in the Philippines

Snaebjorn Gunnsteinsson - In: Journal of development economics 144 (2020)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237193

Observing unobservables : identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment

Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan - 2005

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610980

An experimental study on adverse selection and moral hazard

Yamamoto, Shin'ichi; Yoneyama, Takau; Kwon, W. Jean - In: Hitotsubashi journal of commerce & management 46 (2012) 1, pp. 51-64

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009716607

Asymmetric information and insurance : An experimental approach

Bedsworth, Fredrick; Neal, Daniel R.; Portillo, Javier E.; … - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 92 (2021), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643572

Observing unobservables : identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment

Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002962479

Observing unobservables : identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment

Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003444339

Contracting inside an organization : an experimental study

Healy, Paul J. (contributor) - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 10 (2007) 2, pp. 143-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608153

Observing unobservables : identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment

Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 77 (2009) 6, pp. 1993-2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943454

Rewarding Success and Failure : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Strategic Experimentation

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques P.; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2022

A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent being relatively more optimistic than the low type. The agent also engages...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243695

An experimental investigation on optimal bankruptcy laws

Di Cagno, Daniela; Spallone, Marco - In: European journal of law and economics 33 (2012) 1, pp. 205-229

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578500