A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer)who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjectstreatment) to capture...

A conditional cooperator in a public goods game wants to match hispartners' expected contribution. We investigate theoretically and empiricallywhether (and to what extent) conditional cooperation can explainhow individual contributions evolve in a repeated two-person public goodsexperiment using...

The Nash Bargaining problem in the context of a random utility modelyields a stochastic demand for each player, conditional on his or her beliefs re-garding the other player's behavior. We derive a symmetric logit equilibriumunder naive expectations that converges to the Nash axiomatic solution...