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Relative Position, Prices of Sacrifice and Reciprocity: An Experimental Study Using Individual Decisions
Brandts, Jordi; Fatás, Enrique; Lagos, Francisco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
-offs in an intuitive way but also by whether individuals obtain more or less than others. We find little reciprocity of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547280
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Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and … reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical Papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a … insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656392
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Hold-up induced by demand for fairness : theory and experimental evidence
Raghabendra Pratap KC; Lauga, Dominique; Mak, Vincent - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 94 (2023) 4, pp. 721-750
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014291725
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Motives of sanctioning: Equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment
Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - 2012
reciprocity norm, irrespective of monetary consequences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291837
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Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game
González, Luis G.; Levati, Maria Vittoria - 2007
In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275035
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Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game
Gonzalez, Luis G.; Levati, M. Vittoria - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
In a two-person ï¬nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speciï¬cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090581
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Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 26-43
Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664597
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Motives of Sanctioning: Equity and Emotions in a Public Good Experiment with Punishment
Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
reciprocity norm, irrespective of monetary consequences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010565809
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Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs
Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006
We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547446
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Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs
Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572147