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Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

this desire conflicts with other strong motivationsa typical reaction is to trade off fairness against these other concerns …. Inequ(al)ity aversion allows capturing such trade off considerations in various ways(Bolton, 1991, Bolton and Ockenfels …, 1998 and 2000, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999,are examples).Such trade off analysis measures how far one deviates from fairness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866826

Information Aggregation and Beliefs inExperimental Parimutuel Betting Markets

Koessler, Frédéric; Noussair, Charles; Ziegelmeyer, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2007

We study sequential parimutuel betting markets with asymmetrically informed bettors, usingan experimental approach. In one treatment, groups of eight participants play twenty repetitionsof a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observedby other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866873

Motives of sanctioning: Equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment

Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - 2012

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291837

Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game

González, Luis G.; Levati, Maria Vittoria - 2007

In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275035

Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games

Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik - 2011

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320291

Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution ExperimentWith One-Way Communication

Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria; Weisser, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022164

On the Independence of Observations betweenExperiments

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften - 2009

In experimental economics there exists a lively debate about the independenceof observations. Although opinions on the issue dier widely, allconcerns regard the independence of subjects' behavior within one sessionor experiment. This paper attempts to shed some light on the independenceof...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022174

Logit estimation of conditional cooperationin a repeated public goods experiment

González Morales, Luis G.; González-Farías, Graciela; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A conditional cooperator in a public goods game wants to match hispartners' expected contribution. We investigate theoretically and empiricallywhether (and to what extent) conditional cooperation can explainhow individual contributions evolve in a repeated two-person public goodsexperiment using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866947

Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test

Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Kritikos, Alexander - European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)Department … - 2006

How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), ifpayment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is byitself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknoteand giving the agent the first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869683

Credible communication and cooperation : experimental evidence from multi-stage Games

Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 81 (2012) 1, pp. 207-219

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505570