We study experimentally partnership protocols of the sort proposed by Kalai and Kalai (2010), for bilateral trade games with incomplete information. We utilize the familiar game analyzed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983), with a buyer and seller with value...

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

This paper combines an economic experiment with survey data to investigate determinants of trust and trustworthiness in the Dutch society. We contrast the inferences which can be made on the trust propensity using stated and revealed measures and we test for participation bias in our experiment....

Die empirische Prüfung theoretischer Forschungsergebnisse wirft in der Ökonomie - wie bei jeder Sozialwissenschaft - Probleme auf. Anders als in den Naturwissenschaften können kaum volkswirtschaftliche Labors errichtet werden. Seit einigen Jahren nutzen Ökonomen die Erfahrungen der...

This article describes how there exists ample experimental evidence demonstrating a positive wage-effort relationship in which the results from the employee's effort lead to deterministic firm payoffs. The authors thus investigate a reframed version of the gift-exchange game in which the firms'...

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...

We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules....