We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. By constructing an appropriate infinitely repeated export game, we show that varying country sizes will pose difficulties in sustaining the collusive behaviour.

We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. By constructing an appropriate infinitely repeated export game, we show that varying country sizes will pose difficulties in sustaining the collusive behaviour.

This paper argues that international trade should affect local organization of production in a systematic way. By using the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model we show that the export sector is more likely to demonstrate fragmentation, entrepreneurship and outsourcing compared to the...

We use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, not just its effect on the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant countries will restrict the volume of world trade while corrupt capital-abundant countries promote trade....

Firm heterogeneity is mostly discussed in the literature from the viewpoint of productivity differential. In contrast this paper recognizes wealth heterogeneity as an important factor that results in firm heterogeneity. The issue of wealth heterogeneity and export incentive through credit market...