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Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium

Drugov, Mikhail - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2011

involves an inefficient delay. As the commitment power of the principals decreases, this incentive becomes stronger. When …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008861885

Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities

Kawamori, Tomohiko; Miyakawa, Toshiji - In: Economics letters 183 (2019), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012122548

Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy

Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2010

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699644

Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy

Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2010

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935694

Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities

Björnerstedt, Jonas; Westermark, Andreas - 2008 - rev.

stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128002

Rational exuberance

Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - In: European economic review : EER 56 (2012) 6, pp. 1220-1240

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696347

Collective hold-up

Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100

agents increases inefficient delay and reduces agents' welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325262